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Introduction
Any systems analytical effort on optimization of safeguards measures, ~)as to
aim ultimately at a system which is economic and effective. These twe facters
are closely interrelated and cost optimization can hardly be undertaken without
having some quantifiable basis for the effectiveness of safeguards systems.
In a previous paper with the same title L-l-7 an effort was undertaken to define
and analyse the effectivity of safeguards systems. It WaS shown that if one could
make the postulate that there exists a relation between the probability of de-
tection p (m ) (to be attained by an inspection system), and the amount m
o e
assumed to be diverted then the costs of a safeguards system as a function of
m , optimized with respect to this p (m ) could be defined as the effectivity
o 0
of a safeguards system. This effectivity could then be taken as a yard stick
for the comparison of safeguards systems based on completely different methods.
It was noted that the postulation of a relation between p(m ) and m might be
o 0
aasoc.iated with same difficulties and that further work on the effe~ti.vi.t:y W;,iS
continued.
In the present paper a different method has been developed for the definition
and analysis of the effectivity cf safeguards systems. One ef the main features
of this method is the fact that it does not require the existence of a relation
between p(m ) and m •
o 0
J)Paper presented at the lAEA Working Panel on Systems Analysis, held
on 25-29 August 1969, Vienna
2)Institut für Angewandte Reaktorphysik, Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe
3The basic idea underlying the newmethod may be stated in the following
manner.
All technical parameters, which influence the probability of detection in the
case of a diversion, in a realistically designed safeguards system, can be
expressed as equivalent random measuring variances. The sum of all these varian-
ces after establishing the material balance in a nuclear facility, over aperiod
of time, determines almost uniquely the quality of statement on the probability
of detection. If one assurnes as a first approximation that all these variances
are normally distributed, one can easily visualize the fact that the quality
of the probability statement inrpro'ITes when the sum öf the va.riances decreases.
The generation of all these variances (while establishing the material balance),
is associated with costs. These costs may be taken to be the safeguards budget
available to a safeguards authority over a time period for executing various
safeguards measures. The main objective of these measures is to make statement
on a detection in case of a diversion, which can only be done if a material
ba l ance has been established. It can therefore be s~id that the more accurate
these statements are, the more effective is the safeguards system. However,
accuracy of statements can not be improved indefinitely without increasing the
costs of safeguards also indefinitely. Because of this restriction, it would
be reasonable to utilize a given safeguards budget in such a way that the com-
binations of all the variances in establishing material balance, give the highest
possible probability of detection p(m ) for a given m , assumed to be diverted.
o 0
This optimized p(m ) can be assertained as a function of different inspection
o
budgets and has been defined as the effectivity of the inspection system in
this paper ,
It is to be noted that such adefinition is bi-parametric in nature, i.e.
it depends both on the costs of safeguards and on the amount assumed to he
diverted. In App. I an effort has been made to eliminate the explicit dependence
of effectivity on the amount assumed to be diverted.
In the first cha.pter of this paper all the relevant vadances which go in,
in the establishment of a material balance, have been considered. The second
chapter deals with the cost functions in connection with the generation of
4these variances. In the third chapter the statement which an inspection
authority can make on the basis of the measured values, has beendeveloped.
On the basis of these three considerations, the concept of effectivity has
been developed in the fourth chapter. A simplified numerical example has
been given in chapter five to indicate the influence of various cost functions
on the minimization of the sum of the variances for a given budget. Some
generalized conclusions complete the paper.
51. Variances in Establishing Material Balance in a Nuclear Facility
M.
1.
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}lliF
M
o
....
Fig. 1
Let the period under consideration be one year. During this period, a measured
amount of fissile material 11. flows into a typical nuclear facili ty as shown
1-
in Fig. 1. During the same time, corresponding measured amounts of product M
o
and waste WIeave the facility. Besides this, a certain amount of material V
is assumed to remain in the plant (Material Unaccounted For, MUF).
Process inventory taking takes p1aces n times in a year so that the interval
between two consecutive inventory takings is t = 1:. /-yr 7. This time is taken
n - -
as the inventory period. This inventory taking ensures that at the time of
taking the inventory and establishing a material balance the fissile material
amount I is actually present in the plant.
For developing the subsequent model it is assumed that once in a year the operator
plans to divert m amount of fissile material. The time required for diverting
o
this amount is small compared to the interval between two inventories.
(Note: it can also be assumed that the diversion of m takes place spread
o
over the whole year. This case is more complicated and will be treated later~)
If it is further assumed that at the beginning of an inventory period, the
inventory is known exactly (which is only an approximation; this problem has
been analysed in ~2-7), then the true values of the total material balance
at the end of an inventory period are given by :
M. - M - W - V - I-rn = 0
1. 0 0
(1,,1)
The measured values of M., M , land Ware all considered to be random in
1. 0
nature.
61.1 _I_n./:-p_u_t_a_n_d_O_u_t....p,-u_t_M_e__a_s_u_r_e_m_e_n_t..:,~Mi~
These measurements are assumed to be normal distributed with the expectation
va1ues EMi and EMo with the variances a~, and a~ • As is shown be10w, these
, , I' 1 'h' 1 0var1ances 1ncrease 1near y W1t t1me:
where s
and ö2M,
1
is the running time
... const; ö2 ... const.M
o
• s
Let
Q r I I IUJ~ I ,~
be the batches each masured with the variance ö~
2Ea\! ... Ea; o a
\I
Then
a2 ( ) 2a == l~ö
\I a
2 ,2 2 2
° (a) ... 0 a E a; Öa ... const.
Since 1 == ~ where k is the time between the measurement of the two batches,
going over to the limit for small time intervals between batches
k -+- ds; E2a -+- dE2a
2 2 dE
2a
° (1:a ) ... 0 . S\I a ds
(This proves equ. 1.2.)
The input and output measurements consist normally of a measurement giving
the amount of the material (volume or rate) and another measurement giving the
concentration of fissile material in this material so that:
M< == c > V
The variances are then given by:
22222
aM ... 0 c • E V + aV E c
(1.3)
0.4)
72. . 0 2 2The varianee ° eons1sts of the var1anee 0 the random error and °
e ez es'
the systematie error, whieh is a eharaeteristie of the analytieal laboratory
in whiehthe measurements are earried out. Sinee the systematie errors may
vary randomly from time to time in the same laboratory, they ean also be
expressed as a random distribution. Therefore:
2 0 2
o = 0
c ez
2
+ 0
es
(1.5)
(1.6)q
2
°ez =
0 2
repetitions the value of 0ez is redueed by a faetor of q:
0 2
o
ez
With q
The whole relative variance is then givenby:
o~ 2 152 2 202 (5 2 2 2 °cz °es CJv (1.7)= = z + 0R, ; Oz = R a __ + __J E2J E2e E2c E2V
1.2 Inventory I
The measurements for the inventory are also assumed to be normally distributed
with the expectation value EI and the variance 0i. The following relation i8
valid
where again 0i .. const and is the relative standard deviation for a single
measurement.
1.3 Haterial UnaccountedFor, V
In the eontext of the present paper, the material unaeeounted for (MUr) has
been taken to be equiva1ent to the losses V whieh oeeur inside the plant.
These losses V have been assumed to be related to the input in the following
manner:
V = v (1.9)
This means that the losses V (MUF) have been taken to be proportional to
the size of the plant, whieh, as a first approximation, may be assumed to
inerease with the square-root of the throughput.
8Under normal operating conditions the MUF may be caused by a number of
factors {-3_7 namelYt a) systematic errors in measurements t b) unmeasured
wastes leaving the plantt c) mal operations t d) fissile material plating
out on plant component surface and similar phenomena. The first three compo-
nents can either be eliminated or with certain efforts accounted fore There-
fore t only the fourth component has been taken to be the cause of MUF
in this paper and denoted as the internal lossest V.
It has been assumed that these losses V attain a maximum~lue within a short
time after startup of the plant and then vary statistically around this value.
This means that V has also been considered to be normally distributed varying
randomly with the expectation value EV = 0 and the variance o~. It is further
assumed that o~ is known both to the inspector and the operator.
1.4 Wastest W
In this paper it has been assumed that
w= w· M.
~
(1.10)
(1.11)= const.• sdS
2
• w
and that w is a constant. The measured values for the wastes are normally
distributed with the expectation vaiue EW and the variance o~. Por this
variance the same type of relation as in equ. (1.2) can be postulated.
dE2M.
1
2
where 0w is the relative variance for a single measurement for the waste
stream.
It is to be noted that the assumption W= const is not exactly consist~nt
with the condition that V is random. It
that all the random variations in V are
by the fact that Wnormally consists of
has been implicitely assumed here
reflected in M • This is justified
o
a smali fraction of M •
o
2. Cost Factors in Connection with the Variances
The generation of the measuring variances is associated with costs. It is
assumed that an inspection authority has a fixed budget to spend over a given
9period of time (i.e. one year), in establishing a complete fissile material
balance around a nuclear facility over a given period of time. This bUdget
can be spent on the following two categories of measures:
2.1 Flow measurements
2.2 Inventory measurements
2.1 Flow Measurements
2.1.1 Input and Output: Let there be r t(r2) input (output) batches for
measurement in a year. Every input (output) batch is measured qt(q2)
times. The unit costs of measurement are Y1(Y2) for each input (output)
batch. The total costs for flow measurements Kr!yr are then given by
(2.1)
if the relative variance for a single measurement be denoted by
2 2
00 • (0 0 ) for the input (output) batch, then equ. (2.1) in conjunction
Zl. zo
with equo (106) is reduced to the form
+
r z f Z
Z 20~1o -öRo
(2.2)
2.2.2 Waste Measurements: Similar considerations as in the case of input and
output measurements (equs. 1.4 to 1.7 and 2.1 to 2.2) lead to the cost
relation of the following form:
~=
r 3 f 3
2 2~···ii= RW
where r 3 gives the number of waste measurements per year'Ya the
unit cost for analysis and 0;, the relative variance for a single
analysis.
2.2 Inventory Taking
The costs for inventory taking have been assumed to be proportional to
10
a) the frequency. One inventory taking costs Y4 units
b) repetition of measurements. The costs for each measurement is Y2 units,
i.e. same as that for the output measurement
As mentioned in the beginning, n inventories are taken per year and the
measurements are repeated m times. t = l is the interval for an inventory
n
period. With 0i defined similarly as in eqs.(1.3) and (1.7), the total inven-
tory costs/year are given by
or
Kr = ny + n 'mo y4 2 (2.4)
1
= -t
f) 22-2--· ;f= Y • 0
0I-oR 2 zo (2.5)
The interval t can be limited on both sides with the help of the following
consideration:
Inventory period cannot be less than t corresponding to the residence time
u
of fissile material in a nuclear facility. It should not be greater than a
Critical time t , before which the material balance has to be completed to
c
reduce the consequences of a diversion. This means
2.3 Summary
The total costs K for establishing the material balance in a nuclear facility
comprises therefore of:
(2.6)
2As indicated in the introduction, for a given cast, the variables t, 0 .,
Z1
ö2 , ö2W and 0
2
1 have to be minimized in such a way that the probabilityzo z
of detection p (m ) becomes maximum for an amount of fissile material m
o 0
assumed to be diverted. It should be noted that for the three throughput
measurements the relative variance 02, but for the inventory measurement the
absolute variance 0 2 have been considered for optimization. This is because
of the fact, that the inventory period t has been explicitely taken out for
11
2
optimization and the 0 s for the throughput measurements are a function
of this time t.
3. Statement of the Inspector and Some Related Parameters
3.1 Expectation Values
Let the nominal value of the book inventory J be given by
J = M.
~
M - W
o
(3.1)
Then under the conditions that in the time interval (0, t) the MUF losses
...
V will be realized and that the amount m will be diverted:
o
b
fexp /--
a
... 2
(X-(V+IDO»
202
7 dx (3.2)
2 2
o = 0M
i
Besides.this the following relation is valid
so that
1
b 2
1 r
(x-m )
p(a6J-I'-b/m ) = dx exp L-- o J
0 ~ z n 2a
r2 =
2 2 2 2 2
°M. + °M + °w + °1 + °v~ 0
It is seen from equ. (3.4) that
E(J-I) =ma; 2 2o (J-I) = r (3.5)
Note: The expectation value E(J-I) should not be confused with the "conditioned
expectation value " EM.-EM -EW-EI \which correspond to the expectation values
~ 0
of the measurements M. M Wand I with the realization of a particular value of VJ
~ 0
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Equ. 3.4 gives c
-' c/m)= 1 fdx 2p(-co .c. J-I-m xexp (--)0 o rr; L n 2
-a>
or
p ~oo~J-I-m #lc/m ) = <t> ( c )
o 0 L
3.2 Inspectors Statement
(3.6)
In principle, an inspector can make several types of statements in case of a
diversion of m , after comparing the nominal book values with the measured
o
values of the inventory obtained from the material balance. For example he can
say that an amount> 0 has been diverted or that an amount ~ x has been diverted
or he can say that an amount in the interval cl ~ x ~ c2 has been diverted or
he can also say that an amount x has been diverted. The different methods
used to arrive at such statements and the relative merits of such statements
will be analysed in a later publication. In the present paper, the last type
of inspector's statement (i.e o to state that adefinite amount x has been
diverted in case the operator diverts an amount m ) has been used as an example.
o
The inspector can proceed in the following.manner to come to this type of
statement:
Under the condition that nothing will be diverted, the measured values J-I
will lie in the interval (- 00, 8) with the probability l-a • Corresponding
to the equ.(3.6), the following relation exists between a and g:
l-a
I~A
o g!J. J-I
(3. 7)
The fixation of a, the probability of error, is a matter of judgement on
the part of the inspector. It may be fixed (normally around 5 %) on the basis
of experience, economic and other considerations. Once the value of a has been
13
fixed, the inspector can make the fo11owing statement after obtaining the
~ . '
measured va1ues of J+l as shown in the above sketch (Fig.2)1llt "On the basis
of my measurements I dec1are that the amount
A = J-l-g
has been diverted.
If the measured va1ues of J-l fell in the interval (O,g), the inspector will
make the statement that
"nothing has been diverted ll •
In this connection, the meaning of g can be i11ustrated with some simp1ifying
assumptions. In the case of a diversion of the amount m
o'
if by chance the
trlEva1ues of J+l wou1d be measured and the unaccountab1e losses V be = 0,
than g indicates the difference between the amount diverted m and the amount
o
dec1ared as diverted. That means
g = m - f::.
o
.This is done to keep the error second type (i.e. accusing the operator for
diversion a1though no diversion has taken p1ace) within reasonab1e limits
(see be Low) ,
3.3 Probability of Detectionö Inspector's Errors
3.3.1 Probability of Detection: A detection takes p1ace if 8 >0, Le.
when according to equ. (3.8)
J-l-g >0 (3.10)
The probability that J-l >g when the amount m has been diverted,
o
has been defined in this paper as the probability of detection p(E/m )
o
p (E/m )=p (J-1 >g/m )""l-p (J-1j!(;g/m )
o 0 0
(3.11)
According to equ. (3.4)
p(- CD ~J-16g/m )=
o
so that
1
g-m 2 '
/
0 _ xd" exp L - -- J
L 2L 2
-00
(3012)
(3.13)
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3.3.2 Inspector's Errors: The probability that a diversion will be
stated if nothing is diverted is according to p. 12 equal to a.
The probability that an amount6. will be declared as diverted
which is greater than the amount m which will be diverted in
o
reality, is also a.
There is a second possibility for the inspector to err.:
The inspector states 'no diversion' even if the operator has
diverted the amount m • The probability for this case is given by
o
m -g
B(m ) = p (J-I-g~O/m ) =l-p (E/m ) =l-~ ( 0 )
o 0 0 Z
This probability decreases with increasing m •
o
4. Effectivity
It was indicated earlier that choice of the values of a(probability of error)
and similarly that of B is a matter of judgement. However, i t may be assumed
that they can be established. Then the probabili;ty of detection p(E/m ) may
o
be regarded as the criterion according to whieh the quality of safeguards systems
can be assessed. And the effectivity of such a system can be defined as the
highest probability of detection as a function of costs which can be achieved
by the optimum utilization of a given budget:
Eff(K) = p t(K)op (4.1)
The optimum utilization e>f the costs can be developed in the following
manner:
m
p(E/m ) = ~ (-2- _ ß )
o 1: I:
or after fixing a
(4.2)
15
Equ. (4.2) shows that p(E/m ) increases monotoneously with decreasing E •
o
This means that the optimum utilization of safeguards costs will be
obtained when the sum of all the variances E (in establishing the material
balance) becomes a minimum for these costs. Since this is valid irrespective
of the value of m , and p(E/m ) is always positive, minimization of the value
00·
of E means simultaneously maximization of the value ofp(E/m ).
o
ds
dE~
°ds
Accordingly,the optimization problem is given by the following:
The relation
dE2M.
1
is to be minimized with respect to
') ') 2 ö
2 ') ') ') ') 2 ')ö"". .. Ö"" öR. ; ... ö"" ö ... . ö'" .. ö- -ö • t;oiZ1 M. zo M R , zw w Rw'1 1 0 0
with the following boundary conditions
K ...
rtf}
2 2
öMi-ÖRi
+ +
ö
2
'" ö
2.ff:ö°:-
Ri Z1 Z1
02 '-0 2 -'0 02Ro zo zo
ö2 ~02 60 02
Rw zw zw
2 ff: 2"" 20R O"I-X (4.3)
X2 is the variance obtained by measuring the inventory only once.
For different K' s different minimim Et S are obtained
')
z;"" ...
opt
1
f (K)
(4.4)
where f(K) is an ever increasing function of K.
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Tbe effectivity of a safeguards system is then given together with equ.(4.2)
Eff(K) = (4.5)
In App. I it has been shown that under certain conditions the optimum values
of probability of detection cannot be obtained by minimizing the total variance
I, but the probability itself has to be optimized. A method for tackling such
optimization problems with these conditions has been sketched there.
5. Numerical Example
5.1 Technical and Cost Data
A numerical example for a hypothetical reprocessing plant has been worked out
1n this chapter. The example indicates how the sum of all the variances can
be minimized to obtain the highest possible values of the probability of de-
tection p(E/m ) (for m assumed to be diverted) for a given safeguards budget
o 0
used to establish a material balance. It is needless to mention that the absolute
values used in this example will necessarily change fram plant to plante
The technica1 and the costdata used for the reprocessing plant, are summarized
in Table 5-1. Following comments on Table 5-1 might be useful:
a) The waste streams are assumed to contain 0.5 i. of Pu present in the
input stream.
b) Two types of inventory taking have been assumed; one is based on the
difference in isotope composition of two consecutive batches [-4_7
denoted as the tracer method; the other is the washout method in which
the process inventory is washed out after a certain time.
c) The MUF(Y) has been assumed to reach its maximum va1ue during the start
up of the plant and not during the equiliorium operation under considera-
tion. Therefore, on1y the variance 0y for Y has been considered with
the expectation va1ue EY = O.
d) The number of inventories for the upper and lower limit may appear to Oe
on the high side. Tbey should be considered on1y as an illustration.
17
5.2 Optimization
To keep the complexity of the numerical solution within limits and to maintain
the transparancy! only t (inventory period) and o~ have been varied and the
rest of the variables have been kept constant in this example.
The simplified optimization relation takes then the following form:
To optimize
(5.1)
2
with respect to the variables t, 01 with the following boundary conditions
K 1 (Y4 + r ). -t 2 2
°1 - °R
t ~ t ~ ....u c
2 2 t: 2
°R<oI X
(5.3)
The boundary condition (5.3) with respect to o~ means that even with repeated
analyses, the value of o~ cannot be reduced be~ow that of 0;. 0; consists of
the error in estimating the amount (in the case of a reprocessing plant it is
the measurement of volume in a tank which cannot be reproduced normally), and
the systematic error specific for the laboratory in which the analyses have
been carried out. The upper limit is given by X2 which is the value of o~
2for a single measurement. Higher values of 01 are not possible.
. • . . 2 2 hi . . bThe m1n1mum cost K. 18 g1ven when t = t
c
and 01 = X • T 1S 1S g1ven ytun
(5.4)Y4+Y2t
c
) =r1-(y +t 4
c
K. =
m1n 2 2
X -oR
According to equ. (5.4) the actual values of both K
mi n for the two inventory
variants are
= { 43,200 DM for tracer
K.
m1n
644,000 DM for washout
(5.5)
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The solution of the simplified optimization problem is obtained by first
getting the analytical minimimum of the function (5.1) under the condition
(5.2),and then eliminating 0i with the help of eqs. (5.2) and (5.1).
2 2 r
°1 = °R + Kt-y 4
~2 = 2 2 r
°v
+ 0R + At + Kt-Y4
The optimum t i8 then given by
1
1 ( rK)2)t == K (Y4+0 tA
h .. 2 is given byt e m~nlmum 0T
• L 1
2 2 ( Ar )2aI o = °R + K
(5.6)
(5.7)
(5.8)
(5.9)
d h .• 2. . ban t e m~nlmum r ~s glven y
(5.10)
The K can be eliminated from eqns. (5.8) and (5.9)
so that
(5.11)
Figs. 3 and 6 have been constructed to indicate the cost limits within which
the optimization can be carried out. In both these Figs., constant cost lines
have been plotted in the t, 0i plane, along with the curve for optimized
?
to(dio) according to equ. (5.11). Fig. 3 is for the tracer technique arid
Fig. 6 for the washout methode Within the permissible limits of t and o~
as given by equ.(5.3~ the points at which the curve t (Or2 ) cuts the constant
o 0
cost 1ines, the analytical minimum of r2 gives also the required minimum of ~2
for the cost optimization.
For the tracer method (Fig. 3) the range of costs L-in DM/yr_7 for optimization
i8 given by
(5.12)
19
and that for the washout method (Fig. 6)
5 67.4 • 10 ~ K ~ 1.6 -10 (5.13)
For all other costs outside these intervals the required optimum va1ues
1ie at the boundary of these intervals i.e. between the points A1pA2 and A3
and A4 in Figs. 3 and 6.
The solutions for the optimization problems will then have the fo11owing forms.
a) Tracer method (Figs. 4a t 4b, 4c, 5)
r
t for K . ~K"82.l·104
c m~n
1
..
1 (Y4+( ~K )2) {:"''P 82.1'104 ~K~ 508'104
"" K..opt l .&. .....t for 508' 104 llOK<oo (5.14)n
rO~ + Ktc- Y4
1
2 Ar '2
°R + (T) for0 2 ...Iopt
0 2 + r 5 8 4for 0 • 10 ~K<ooR Kt
n
- Y4
(5.15)
[ 2 +02+At + r for "K!=82.1'104°v K.R c Kt - Y m~nc 42 1= 02 +02+2 Ar '2 AY4 82.l'104"Kio 508-1.04t
opt (-y-) + K forI v R
\ 2 2 r for 508'104 4tK <00 (5.16)
°v +oR+Atn+ Kt
- Y
u 4
one
in the following
has to keep
till the va1ue
can be done
4
... 4.32·10
It is töbe seen that the cost optimization
manner. Starting from the minimum costs K .
m~n
the number of inventories/yr corresponding to t constant
c
of K = 82.1.104 has been attained (Fig. 3). Then one has to reduce both t
(larger number of inventories/yr) and oi (repeated measurements) unti1
(5.17)
K = 508 .106 eorresponding to t has been aehieved. After that one has to
u
keep t eonstant (largest number of inventories/yr possib1e) and deerease
uOie With infinite eosts the fo11owing asymptotie va1ue of L;2 is obtained
"..2 2 2~as = °v + °R + A 'tu = 0.414
Fig. 5 gives the optimum probability of deteetion p(E/m ) i.e. effeetivity
o
of the safeguards system for different eosts as weIl as the asymptotie
values for infinite eosts. It may be noted that the values for lower eosts
eonverge fair1y rapid1y to the asymptotie va1ues. This means that beyond about
105DM/yr no further improvement ean be obtained in effeetivity of the safeguards
system under the given eonditions.
b) Washout method (Figs. 7a, 7b, 7e, 8)
( t for K . '=K'=7.4· 105e ml.n1
2 j .!.. (y +( fK )2 for 7.4 •105<K"16 • 105t opt :: K 4· A ...
5t for 16.1' 10 "K<oo
u
(5.18)
') r
'105oL. + for K . ~K'=7.4R Kt -y m~n
e 4
02 1
=
°i + ( Ar )2 7.4 o 105" K616 0 105Iopt forK
02 + r
5 (5.19)for 16'10 -'K<<D
R Kt -y
u 4
-
-
2 2 r
/ ,.. +0 + At + ==----
"» R e Kt-y
1 e 4
o~ +oi + 2 ( ~r) '2 + A~4
r
Kt -y
u 4
5for 16' 10 "K<co (5 020)
possib1e) and decrease
of ~2 is obtained
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In this case again the optimization consißts of keeping the number of inven-
tories/yr corresponding to t constant ti11 the va1ue of K=7.4 _lOS has been
c
attained(Fig. 6). Then one has to reduce both t (larger number of inventories/yr)
and oi (repeated measurements}unti1 K = 16 .105 corresponding to tu has been
achieved.After that one has to keep t constant (largest number of inventories/yr
u
oi. With infinite costs the fo11owing asymptotic va1ue
C.258 (5.21)
In Fig. 8 the optimum probability of detection p(E/m ) i.e. eEfectivity is
o
plotted against m , the amount assumed to be diverted, with optimized costs
o
as parameter. The asymptotic va1ues of p(E/m ) for infinite costs have been
o
show", too. It u~y be seen hare that beyond the minimum value K . of the bud-m1n
get, further increase will not bring any improvement in the effectivity of
the safeguards system.
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Conclusions
The methoddeveloped in this paper to define the effectivity of safeguards
systems, does not require any prior knowledge of the relation between proba-
bility of detection and the amount assumed to be diverted. It requires a prior
knowledge only of the measuring errors and other technieal eonditions, which
may influenee a diversion. This method also gives a criterion aecording to
which the utilization of safeguards budget ean be optimized. A number of other
conclusions ean be drawn based on the analysis given in this paper.
a) The effeetivity defined in this paper is for a single nuelear facility.
For developing the concept ofeffeetivity for a safeguards system covering
a number of faeilities or a fuel cyele, the fact that fissile material
will have different values in different facilities (effective kgs), will
have to be taken into eonsideration.
b) The definition of effectivity is based on thelldeteetionll in ease of a diversion.
However, the question of "prevention" has also been touehed by introducing
the coneept of critieal time t , which eompels an inspection authority to
c
take an inventory and complete a material balance before a eertain time has
lapsed. This point ean be further emphasized by optimizing the relation p/t.
In that case optimization of ~ alone, as has been done here, will not he Lp ,
c) In a number of other cases also (for example, if the variance for MUF losses V
were not normally distributed, or in ease the diversion was assumed to
be spread over the whole year etc.), minimization of ~ alone will not give
the optimum probability of detection. In such eases the probability of de-
tection whieh is independent of m might be a better value to optimize
o
(see App , I).
d) Considerable amount of further work is required to solve still open problems
in conneetion with the effectivity of safeguards system.
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Appendix I
It was indicated in the paper that under certain conditions the minimization
of the value of r 2 might not give the highest probability of detection p(E/m ).
o
Such conditions arise when for example, one of the random events is not normally
distributed, or when it is assumed that diversion takes place spread over the
whole year. Optimization of p(E/m ) under such conditions might lead to inspection
o
procedures which are strongly dependent on the absolutevalues of m assumed
o
to be diverted. In general the explicit dependence of the probability of detection
on m can be eliminated if it s defined in the following manner"
o
(1.1)
Here dp (m ) is the probability with which the operator plans to divert the
o
amount m • It can be regarded as the"operator' s strategy". One has .to have
o
some idea on this strategy before one can optimize P. One way of fixing the
strategy is discussed below:
1. Estima~e of. th~ operator's strategy (rlp (mo2l
It may be assumed that the amount m = m assumed to be diverted, where
o 00
m =m. (e.g. 0.01 M., 6 kg Pu)
00 1n 1
has to be detected wieh a probability > po.
This means, it is required that
p(E/m ) ~ p for m ä m
o 0 0 00
In the case of the model used in the paper it would mean
m =1
<p( ~o - <p (l-a»
or
m
00
-} -}
<p (p + <p (l-a»
o
(1.2)
(1.3)
The requirement 1.3 means an additional boundary condition for the optimization
problem formulated in the text under (4.4). This can be argurnented in the following
way:
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Because of the fact that the probability of detection p is extremely high
o
(it can be chosen to be 99 %) for a m > m , the operator will not divert
o 00
an amount ~ m • Below this value if the operator intended to divert an amount,
00
the probability of diversion would be the same for all the amounts. With
dp (m ) = f (m ) dm
o o· 0
the following type of equal distribution can be considered:
(1.4)
f(m )
o
I
A. Fig. 2
4----+
1
P = A
A=min(O.OM., 1 kg)
1.
The probability of detection according to eqn. 1.1
Af p(E/mo)dmo
o
m
o
(1.5)
Eff(K)
or"the effectivity" as defined in the text is then given by
A
= i ;r~(m~f(K)-~-}(l-a»dmo
o
With the help of the eqn.
(1.6)
xf </l(t~a )dt =
-00
. . .. ) ..x±a,(x+a <fJ(ß>
2
+~ exp /-... (x±~)
JI2'; - 2S2 7
(1.7)
the integration of 1-6 can be carried out with the result:
-} -} -} -1
Eff(K)IIl_
A
l ' ( A ep (l-a) ,A;( A-q, (l-a»+ .P......J1- a ) , 4>(- ep (I-tl'> +
L f(K) 'P f (K) f(!C).. . T(K',
( _ Af(K)-<I>-1(I-a»2 )_ (ep-} (l_a»2
... 1 (exp 2 exp ( - 2 )]
f(K)(2:rr
(1.8)
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A further solution for dp(m ) can be obtained with the theory of games.
o
The choice of dp(m ) would be the operator's strategy and the choice of
o
a (probability of error) would be the inspector's strategy. The pay-off
functions would be the expectations values of the gains or the losses in
case of a detection or a non-detection or a false detection of a diverted
amount ..
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I
J
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o
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Expectadon value of therandom variable a
Effectivity as a function of the costs
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Input. Output
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Probability of detection as a function of the material m
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Time interval between two inventory taking
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Material unaccounted for (~ruF)
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Error probabi1ities
Cost factors
Relative variance of the random variable a
Amount of material. declared as diverted
Error function
Inverse of the error function
Variance of the random variable a
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Table 5-1: Technical and cost data for a hypothetical reprocessing
plant, used to illustrate effectivity of safeguards systems
1. Type of plant
2. Number of working days/year
Reprocessing plant operating
batchwise at the input and output
end
200
3. 'l'hroughput
a) Input
b) Output
c) Waste
Kg Pu/d
Number of batches/d
Relative variance/analysis 1-%_7
Costs ~DM/analysis_7
Kg Pu/day
Number of batches/d
Relative variance/analysis /-% 7
Costs ~DM/analysis_7
Kg Pu/d
Number of analysis/d
Relative variance/analysis /-% 7
Costs L-DM/analysis_7 --
3
3
1.0
400
2.985
7.5
1
100
0.015
1
10
25
4. Inventory
a) Tracer Relative variance/measurement
Volumetric+systematic_(~)L-%_7
Concentration (6 ) I %,
zo --
Costs(Y4) /-DM/inventory 7
Costs(y2) Z-DM/analysis :7
b) Washout Relative variance/measurement
Vo1umetric+Systematic_(~)L-%_7
Concentration (6 ) /% I
zo --
Costs(y4) /-DM/inventory-ZCosts(y2) Z-DM/ana1ysis /
S. Li-mt-s- -fa-I;- i-nven-t-a-ry pe-~-i-Qd
2
8
5000
400
0.3
0.7
80,000
400
6. MUF(V)
Lower limit Fa 7
Number of inventories/yr
Upper limit F« 7
Number of inventories/yr
2 - 2 7Variance (ov} LkgPu·
10
20
25
8
0.25
7. Mean Hold-up L-kgJ 20
K=1.27·10 5
2
8
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